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“no one leaves home unless
home is the mouth of a shark
you only run for the border
when you see the whole city running as well
your neighbors running faster than you
breath bloody in their throats
the boy you went to school with
who kissed you dizzy behind the old tin factory
is holding a gun bigger than his body
you only leave home
when home won’t let you stay.”
Warsan Shire,
“Home”
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Abstract
This paper addresses the contemporary roots and implications of Islamophobic
sentiments in Italian society by examining a specific case study: the Libyan refugee crisis. I begin
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by analyzing the history of Italy’s imperialism in Libya between 1911 and 1945, in which I examine
how Italian imperial practices (coupled with United States and British intervention post World War
II) have influenced the economic and political state that Libya is in today, in order to understand
the connections between imperialism and the Libyan refugee crisis. I then provide the theoretical
framework of Islamophobia, set forth by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, to
give context to understand contemporary implications of Islamophobia and what it means for
Italian identity building. After presenting this conceptual framework, I address the rise of populism
in Italy to show how right-wing political parties have pushed back against incoming immigrants
from Muslim majority countries. Understanding the rise of right-wing populism allows for greater
understanding of how Islamophobia manifests itself when coopted and mobilized by a group of
people. Then, I examine the various factors that have influenced Italian Islamophobic sentiments
since the beginning of the Libyan refugee crisis in 2009. This analysis fuses a gap in knowledge
about the different factors affecting domestic tensions between Italians and Muslim immigrants.
Moreover, it seeks to determine what factors have allowed the Lega Nord party to enact and
enforce laws that target refugee communities. After examining these factors, I conclude with a
glimpse into the future at an attempt to understand how the instituted legislation directed at
refugees and Muslim communities affects political and economic relations between Italy and the
Muslim world.

Introduction
Addressing the systems of governance and economic exploitation that European powers
institutionalized in their colonies is crucial to understanding the development of modern nations
after colonialism. In order to understand contemporary migration patterns that have developed
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between Italy and Libya, it is important to examine how Italy’s imperial past has influenced political
and economic strife in Libya today. Contextualizing the past in order to understand its effects on
contemporary issues facilitates a better understanding of how the political and economic strife in
Libya has forced many to seek refuge outside Libya’s borders. Until the 1980’s, Italy was a country
with significant out migration, and the recent influx of refugees from Libya has not only challenged
the Italian state to extend its resources to a new community of people seeking economic
prosperity, it has challenged the homogenous, European, Catholic identity that Italy has fostered
since 1871, leading to domestic tensions between Italians and Muslim refugees that has
manifested as institutionalized racism. Between 1970 and 2015, the number of Muslims in Italy
increased from roughly 2,000 to 2 million. That is, the percentage of Muslims of the total
population of Italy increased from less than 1% to 3.7%, the fourth largest percentage in Europe
(Hackett, 2016). Due to recent economic and political strife in Libya, a yearly average of 170,000
refugees have found themselves on the borders of Southern Italy. Resultantly, the large influx of
immigration to Italy from Libya and other Muslim majority countries has prompted Islamophobic
sentiments within Italian society and right-wing political parties have coopted these sentiments to
fuel a structured, tangible movement against Muslims living in Italy.
Therefore, through the examination of Italy’s colonial history in Libya (specifically its use
of violence and economic exploitation), this paper seeks to address the factors that have
influenced the rise of Islamophobic sentiments in Italy, how Islamophobia operates in
contemporary Italian society and politics, and the transition in immigration policy that has forcibly
repatriated thousands of Libyans. Through the lens of the theoretical framework of Islamophobia,
I analyze how, despite some scholars’ claims that Italy has successfully integrated Muslim
refugees, the Italian media’s representation of radical Islam, the rise of right wing, xenophobic
political parties, and the promotion of a homogenous Italian identity have allowed for the
enactment and enforcement of laws targeting refugee integration and endorsed a general mistrust
of Muslim peoples.
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Historical Roots of Contemporary Immigration
Libya’s Pre-Colonial Moment
Italian imperial interests in Libya date back to 1880, when the government declared its
desire for two trading posts on Libya’s North coast, Cyrenaica and Tripoli. Five years later, at the
Berlin Conference of 1885, Italy formally acquired rights to penetrate Libya from stronger imperial
powers, the British and French. Between 1900 and 1911, the Italian press began calling on the
Italian government to seek control of Tripoli, arguing that the region (Cyrenaica and Tripoli)
“naturally belonged to the Italians” as it was historically part of the Roman Empire. (Lutsky, 1969,
Diplomatic Preparations section, para. 13). On September 28, 1911 Italy declared its intended
occupation. The Italian government provided Ottoman Empire with an ultimatum, claiming Italy’s
interest in providing Tripolitania with the “blessings of progress” (Lutsky, 1969, The Italo-Turkish
War of 1911 section, para. 1). In exchange for the gifts of progress, the Ottomans were asked to
stand down and not resist the new occupation. The Young Turk government responded
peacefully, stating they were willing to meet Italian demands as long as they aligned with
Ottomans interests. However, they objected to a permanent occupation, resulting in Italy’s
declaration of war on September 29, 1911.
Overall, Ottoman forces were no match for the Italian navy. The Italian fleet blockaded
Tripoli by sea and British forces refused to let Ottoman troops pass through Egypt. Therefore, the
Ottoman Empire could not send reinforcements and food supplies, causing a famine in Libya. The
war was short lived with an Italian to Ottoman troop ratio of 50,000 to 7,000. Within two months
the war was over, and on November 5, 1911 Italy officially annexed Tripoli. In following peace
negotiations, the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1912, the Ottomans withdrew their troops and high
officials. However reluctant, the Ottoman Empire refused to recognize Italian sovereignty over all
of Libya1 (Raza, 2012, p. 18-19). On an international level, other imperial European powers
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Upon the annexation of Tripoli in 1911, Italy changed its name to Libya.
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(Russia, Britain, France, Germany) objected to Italy’s decision to invade Libya. They viewed Italy’s
expansionist policies as a violation of international norms and contrary to the liberal ideals of the
Risorgimento. Upon formal declaration of invasion, however, none of these powers sought to stop
Italy from what it was doing. Instead, they adopted policies of non-interference, hinged upon
Italian support of their own colonial endeavors. Therefore, upon arrival in Libya, Italian settlers
quickly established the new territory as their “promised land” (Jayne, 2010, p. 28). In Tripoli, the
Italian navy established bases, Catholic missionaries established mission sites, and banks and
schools were opened.
Nevertheless, upon conquest in 1911, Italians were convinced of Libya’s strategic
geography.2 They believed its location served as the gateway to the center of Africa and that its
lands could be revived once the desert was conquered. The government was also convinced that
Libya was a “’Little Eden’ where farming would flourish and where the unskilled could prosper”
(Jayne, 2010, p. 28). However, the true underlying rationalization of its conquest was to serve as
a place of emigration for an overpopulated peasant class in southern Italy. In order to send large
groups of Italian citizens to live in Libya, the government devised a “gradualist policy of slow
economic penetration,” wherein Italian businessmen bought Libyan commercial and
manufacturing interests (which sought to monopolize Libya’s shipping lines and export industry),
to employ Italians and gain economic profit (Raza, 2012, p. 7).
Despite economic presence, Italians were never welcomed in Libya. Between 1912 and
1922, they were met with resistance from the Sanusi, a jihadist Order that was designed to protect
the Islamic world from the ‘outer’ world. The Italians were unable to crush this resistance. The
Sanusi Order, founded by Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, was developed in 1798 is
response to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt. The order was founded to create “awareness within
the Muslim world of the innate power and threat Europe was to embody” (Raza, 2012, p. 8).
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Moreover, it developed mutually beneficial economic and political relationships with indigenous,
Bedouin tribes that helped it harvest political power and exert influence in regional, North African
affairs. By 1899, the Sanusi Order had developed “a monopolistic economic control over the
Eastern Sahara and associated that with control over the internal power structures of tribal
society” (Raza, 2012, p. 11).
Between 1876 and 1883, al-Mahdi resisted Ottoman demands for reinforcements in wars
against the Russians, Egyptian Arabi Pasha, and the Sudanese Mahdi. By 1902, under al-Mahdi
(al-Sanusi’s son), the Sanusi Order had developed into a full-swing resistance movement.
However, resistance was not in full swing until 1902 when the French invaded the Saharan
territories. When the French invaded, they destroyed religious houses, and, when the Italians did
the same in Cyrenaica, “the Order had no choice but to mount a resistance” (Raza, 2012, p. 13).
Therefore, while the land and sea blockade forced Ottoman defeat, the Sanusi Order refused to
accept Italy’s annexation without a fight. Their resistance movements began during the ItaloTurkish War and continued on-and-off throughout the entire time that Italy was present in Libya
between 1911 and 1951. As Raza reclaims, “The Sanusi Chief al-Sharif (grandson of the
Founder) against the advice of his councillors made the decision to throw the Order into the
struggle and in essence transform the trade-orientated organisation into a guerrilla force” (Raza,
2012, p. 20). The realization that Italian forces were unable to defeat the Sanusi resistance
brought about the years of the accords. Between the 1916 and 1922, “the Italian policy, unable to
crush the resistance, shifted its direction to making peace with the Sanusi” (Raza, 2012, p. 29).
In these negotiations, Italy was forced into a multidimensional treaty that obliged the government
to recognize Sanusi Order autonomy as well as Libyan religious autonomy and Islamic judiciary
customs. It also granted Cyrenaica a parliament which was established in 1920. Moreover, to
silence further resistance movements, Muhammad Idris, head of the Sanusi Order, became
formally recognized as a prince and was given a stipend of 300,000 lire per month (Raza, 2012,
p. 31).
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From Sphere of Influence to Colony
In 1934, Libya was formally declared a colony of Italy, a result of a long fought process
that sought to relocate Southern Italy’s growing peasant class. This phenomenon, known as
demographic colonization, refers to “the transplantation of self-supporting groups of peasants
from the mainland.” (Jayne, 2010, p. 27) In 1932, prior to its official declaration as a colony, the
Italian government created the Libyan Colonization Board to devise a plan for transporting Italian
families to Libya. However, until claiming Libya as a formal colony, Italy was hesitant to foster
unity between its two provinces (Tripoli and Cyrenaica) because it feared a growing alliance
between Arabs and Bedouins. The government feared Italian forces stood no chance to the tribal
governance these two groups desired. Despite these fears, the Italian government still sought to
unify Italy and Libya. In 1929, the two administrations were “consolidated… under a single
governor with the capital in Tripoli.” In 1934 the press officially announced the unification of Libya,
which would later become a territorial extension to the Kingdom of Italy in 1939 (Jayne, 2010, p.
27-28).
However, despite spending almost 30 years fully conquering Libya, Italian colonization
efforts in Libya were largely unsuccessful until the latter half of the 1930’s. By 1937 only 300
families had settled in Libya, but that number continued to double and by 1939 more than 110,000
Italian immigrants were settled. Under Italo Balbo, the Italian Governor-General of Libya, all Italian
families that came to Libya were guaranteed prosperity. The Italian government ensured
immigrant success by giving each family a car, a strategic plan that allowed immigrants to travel
further into the interior of Libya to expand colonial settlements outside of Tripoli and Cyrenaica
(Jayne, 2010, p. 32).
Lasting Impacts of Imperialism on Libyan Infrastructure
Despite the government’s claimed success, Italy’s colonial endeavors in Libya had lasting
impacts that are still echoed today. In its wars against the Sanusi Order and other Bedouin tribes,
Italian rule displaced more than 20,000 people, most of whom took refuge in Egypt. The Italians
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also placed more than 100,000 rebels in concentration camps with harsh, life threatening
conditions. Altogether, the estimated number of people who died under Italian rule (either by
fighting, disease, or starvation) is around 80,000. Moreover, throughout their regime, Italian rulers
actively repressed Bedouin peoples to advance the development of its settler colony for Italian
immigrants. As historian Dusti R. Jayne says,
not only must the Bedouin be kept off the fertile plateau but [they] must be stabilized in the
country on the edge of the wilderness (predesertico) where, in his opinion, they had
sufficient and suitable land for pasturing and sowing. It was often Italian policy to take the
best coastal lands from Bedouin landowners, sometimes with compensation, other times
without it (Jayne, 2010, p. 35).

By the end of its colonial regime, Italy had followed in the footsteps of other imperial powers by
subjugating indigenous Libyan populations in various ways. However, these actions were not
without consequence, and following independence on December 24, 1951, Italian settlers were
expelled by Libyan officials (St. John, 2008).
Discussing the large patterns of out-migration is a key component of understanding the.
lasting impacts of Italian dominion in Libya that have propelled Libya into its current state of strife.
At the end of World War II, when Italy lost control of its colonial holdings, the United States and
Britain intervened in Libya’s domestic politics with the “protection and assistance of the United
Nations” to impose Western leaning Muhammad Idris as the rightful King (Vandewalle, 2012). In
1969, Idris was overthrown by Libyan nationalists under the leadership of Muammar Qaddafi,
which led the country into three decades free of U.S. and British involvement. Between 1970 and
2000, the Libyan economy flourished as Qaddafi used the revenues from Libyan oil reserves to
invest in education and social welfare programs and provide education for everyone. However, in
the early 2000’s, fearing U.S. intervention, Qaddafi moved his regime to the right. He imposed
austerity measures and cut programs and access to resources for the poor. Simultaneously, while
attempting to improve relations with Libya, the U.S. worked behind the scenes and bribed officials
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within Qaddafi’s government, organized an intelligence team on the ground to operate as a
counter-insurgency, and collaborated with NATO to wage a bombing campaign (Vandewalle,
2012).
Today, the Western backed war in Libya is at the heart of the strife that has ensued since
2004 which has patronized free speech and forced hundreds of thousands of people out of Libya
and into Italy. As multiple rebel groups continue to fight for control of Libya’s de facto government,
“even Libyans aren’t protected. Because of the war and the spread of weapons, even Libyans are
leaving the country because they don’t feel secure”3 (Salustro, 2016).
Theoretical Framework of Islamophobia
Islamophobia is a political construct, set forth in 1997 by the Commission on British
Muslims and Islamophobia. Essential to its understanding is its connotation; it is a “fear of,” yet it
is also a racist ideology. Two prominent scholars on Islamophobia, Alfredo Alietti and Dario
Padovan, associate Islamophobia with two things: one, the fear of the internal enemy, connected
with the fear of the proximity of the Muslim body, and two, the general view of Islamic civilization
as a threat to Western, Christian civilization because of its potential to perpetuate terrorism. In
recent discourse, it has developed into a new category, similar to Antisemitism, called xenoracism. It transcends a ‘phobia’ in multiple ways, the most important being its grouping of all
Muslims into one category: that inferior to Euro-Christian civilization. Moreover, it has called for a
preservation of “our people” (which represents one way of life, standard of living, and race) and
an anti-foreignness sentiment. As understood by Zafar Iqbal, “Islamophobia is a new word for an
old fear.” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 586). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Western
countries (most prominently the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) have
deemphasized the importance of a multicultural society, placing Islam as a threat to the notion of
European-ness, characterizing Islamophobia as explicitly exclusionary. Moreover, instead of the
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fear of one, Islamophobia constitutes a fear of all Islamic civilization. As stated by Alietti and
Padovan, “the guilty party here is the Muslim civilization, reproducing anomic and anonymous
violent guys, broadly global networked to tear up the social fabric of Western democratic societies”
(Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 586). Therefore, Islamophobia is explicitly exclusionary and has for
allowed institutionally supported hate crimes and restricted immigration policies from Muslim
majority countries. In “Rights: Europe's Rising Islamophobia”, Virginie Guiraudon addresses how
Europe’s far right has occupied public space to assert their culture over Muslim practices. He
says, “pointedly insulting anti-Muslim actions are increasing… In Italy, the right-wing Northern
League party organizes processions of pigs on the sites where mosques are to be erected”
(Guiraudon, 2011).
S. Sayyid, another prominent scholar on Islamophobia, identifies Islamophobia as a
“concept that emerges precisely to do the work that categories like racism were not doing”
(Sayyid, 2014, p. 11). He conceptualizes the ongoing critique within the framework of
Islamophobia: the differentiation between the philosophical and political. The philosophical
represents the “lack of clarity about the concept of Islamophobia” while the political involves
understanding the contestation about Islamophobia that has arisen in trying to answer questions
of “national security, social cohesion, and cultural belonging” (Sayyid, 2014, p. 11). Furthermore,
Sayyid argues that the empirical studies of Islamophobia, which analyzes media representations
and socio-psychological approaches, cannot “provide us with a theoretical clarification” (Sayyid,
2014, p. 11). He states,
Islamophobia is rejected not only because there may be a disagreement about whether a
particular practice or behavior meets the criterion of what constitutes Islamophobia, but
also because there is a dispute that any such behavior could be considered to be
Islamophobic, because the concept of Islamophobia lacks any validity (Sayyid, 2014, p.
12).
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Therefore, Sayyid’s research provides an important perspective on understanding Islamophobia:
that which argues Islamophobia does not exist or is too complex to address and define in a single
term.
Ultimately, it is evident that justifications for Islamophobia are grounded in its collection of
lacks (lack of freedom, human worth, and respect for women and queer individuals) and fear that
Muslims will attempt to institutionalize their beliefs in Christian civilization. While Alietti, Padovan,
and Sayyid all provide important understandings for Islamophobia, it is seemingly too complex to
be regarded solely as a fear of Muslims. Instead, Islamophobia should be conceptualized as fully
encompassing the discrimination, exclusion, and racism that Muslims experience worldwide.
Islamophobia Enforced Through Policy
Research on Italian Islamophobia demonstrates that this prejudice has allowed for an
institutionally structured, racist movement against Muslims living in Italy. As highlighted by Alietti
and Padovan [in reference to anti-Muslim xeno-racism], “it is becoming something more
structured, something that we can call a social bonding in order to substitute different forms of
social organization such as the rule of law or class solidarity and cohesion” (Alietti and Padovan,
2013, p. 599). Islamophobic sentiments in Italy have prevailed in multiple ways: publically, through
hate crimes, such as public humiliation for wearing traditional Islamic clothing and vandalizing
Mosques, and politically, in the Italian Parliament. The Lega Nord (Northern League), a right-wing,
xenophobic nationalist party that has successfully passed legislation (Bossi-Fini Law and Law 94)
establishing impediments to offshore rescues, encouraging repatriation of arriving boats, and
making illegal immigration a criminal offense, has institutionalized Islamophobic sentiments
(which fully support and encourage public hate crimes against Muslims) and prevailed as the
vanguard of this racist movement (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 599). As Virginie Guiraudon
states, “the far right in Europe has occupied public space to aggressively assert their culture
against Moslem practices. Pointedly insulting anti-Muslim actions are increasing… In Italy, the
right-wing Northern League party organizes processions of pigs on the sites where mosques are
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to be erected” (Guiraudon, 2011). Furthermore, the Lega Nord has campaigned to build an
“internal enemy” which endorses logic of social antagonism (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 589).
The party has utilized popular, nationalist Islamophobic sentiments and coopted them for their
own benefit, using racist discourse to push legislation that is harmful to future Muslim refugees
and immigrants seeking refuge in Italy.
To better understand how Islamophobia operates in Italy, it is crucial to examine the
implemented immigration policies that have failed to integrate incoming Muslim refugees.
Altogether, Italy’s response to the Libyan refugee crisis has had both social and political
implications. Since 2014, policy has been drafted, redrafted, and changed. The initial influx of
migration from Libya that occurred between 2009 and 2014 allowed Italy to implement a policy
called Mare Nostrum (“Our Sea” in Latin). This policy, presented as a humanitarian and security
operation, allowed for offshore rescuing of boats with refugees heading towards Italian waters.
Through Mare Nostrum, Italy was able to safely bring in over 150,000 refugees. However, the
large influx of refugee from Libya sparked criticism from the European Union and Italian citizens
who condemned Italian leaders for making E.U. borders too easily accessible. Mare Nostrum,
which cost the Italian government 9 million Euros per month, was ultimately replaced by a Triton,
an E.U. initiative to maintain border security (Girard, 2016, p. 9).
As immigrants kept coming into Italy and the Lega Nord continued developing popular
sentiment throughout Italy, its members worked to pass two important laws that have significantly
impacted how the Italian government addresses incoming refugees. The first law, passed in 2002,
is Bossi Fini Law. Bossi Fini Law was drafted in 2001 as a response to the increase in “criminal
activities such as drug-pushing, prostitution and petty crime.” (Eurofound, 2002). While it was not
drafted as a response to the Libyan refugee crisis, it is still applicable to the waves of migration
coming from Libya because it promotes intolerance to immigration, especially to those seeking
economic prosperity and political refuge. According to Eurofound, the European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, “[Bossi Fini] has led a part of the [Italian]
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population to have intolerant attitudes towards immigrants, fueled and exploited by some political
parties such as the Lega Nord” (Eurofound, 2002). Bossi Fini Law is explicitly exclusionary to
refugees because it welcomes high-skilled workers but sets quotas on low-skilled labor. The law
states,
there are no limitations to entry into Italy for highly-skilled workers (university lecturers and
professors, professional nurses etc.)… and a specific immigration office is to be set up in
each province of Italy to oversee the entire recruitment procedure for immigrant workers
on both open-ended and fixed-term contracts (Eurofound, 2002).

Furthermore, Bossi Fini Law limits access to Italian residency permits, denies state protections
and citizenship rights to non-EU minors, and arrests and deports any persons discovered as
undocumented. The second law, passed in 2009, is Law 94. Unlike Bossi Fini Law, Law 94 was
implemented as a direct response (by the Lega Nord) to large influxes of migration from North
Africa to Italy. Moreover, it was implemented because “the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs
estimated that between 2000 and 2006, between 60% and 75% of irregular aliens in Italy had
entered the country legally but had overstayed their visit” (Komada, 2011, p. 459). Of the two laws
examined in this research, Law 94 has greater implications, because it was passed in accordance
with Italian Penal Code, allotting harsher punishments for refugees and illegal immigrants that are
discovered to undocumented. Law 94 states that illegal immigrants are subject to jail time if they
refuse to present their documentation to law enforcement and are subject to a fine if they are
found to be residing in Italy illegally. Articles 6 and 10 of Law 94 state, “in case the foreigner
refuses to show these identification documents (s)he is punished with a fine up to 2000 euro and
up to 1-year imprisonment” and “illegal entry and stay in the territory of the State: is punished with
a fine from 5,000 up to 10,000 euro.” (Law 94, Article 6.2, Article 6.3, and Article 10). However,
Law 94 does not only affect illegal immigrants. It punishes anyone that employs or protects illegal
immigrants. Articles 12 and 22.12 of Law 94 state,
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sanctions with 6 months to 3 years (convertible in fine under 2 years) imprisonment for
those who locate or sell housing to individuals who do not have a regular stay permit at the
moment of the signing/renewal of the contract… and those who employ irregular migrants
are punished with 6 months to 5 years’ imprisonment and with a sanction up to 5000 euro
for every person irregularly employed (Law 94, Articles 12 and 22.12)

Therefore, the intention of using Law 94 to affect the lives of those with proximity to illegal
immigrants, along with using it to challenge illegal immigrants’ lives in the private sphere (including
sports and leisure), makes it nearly impossible for them to exist without adhering to the strict
immigration system that Italy has in place.
Analysis of Factors Institutionalizing Islamophobia in Italy Today
Immigration reform implemented in response to the Libyan refugee crisis is one of many
ways that Islamophobia operates in Italy. Scholars Alfredo Alietti and Dario Padovan argue that
Islamophobia is grounded through ethnocentrism and in times of authoritarianism and anomie,
and their research provides important evidence as to how prejudices can be influenced at the
national level and for political purposes. Most important to this research is the understanding of
how nationalism propels the occurrence of prejudice because, with regards to national identity,
Muslims are an “out-group” that do not fit with the rest of society. Furthermore, the promotion of
a homogenous national identity, such as that in France, denounces individual freedom (i.e. ties
to a country of origin) and forces compliance, resulting in a relationship of “reciprocal causality
with prejudice, making this latter a functional substitute for the social and juridical covenant that
should ensure social harmony and social cohesion” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 596).
Therefore, racism is a means to assert dominance and force assimilation but is also a byproduct
of the attempted creation of social solidarity and an ethno-racial identity. Consequently, when
there is a suspected threat to one’s own identity, there is an emergence of attitudes, in this case
European-ness, that favor one’s own hegemonic group identity (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p.
597).
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I would argue the most significant factor triggering Islamophobic sentiments is the belief
that large influxes of migration can change Italian demographic composition and cultural identity.
The supposed fear of non-Italians stealing Italian jobs stems from the 2008 economic crisis that
devastated the Italian economy. Upon the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (which coincided
with Italy’s adoption of the Euro), most major Italian banks lost significant shares of their capital.
The loss of capital depleted the majority of Italy’s financial resources, putting stress on the
economy and leaving Italy unable to pay off its national deficit (Di Quirico, 2010). Between 2008
and 2009, Italy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by five percentage points and the
national unemployment rate reached nearly 10% (Eurofound, 2010). With the onset of mass
migration into Italy that began in 2009, Italians became fearful that the integration of nearly
300,000 new refugees would strain the government’s resources and propel Italy into further
economic dissension. Therefore, as refugees continued arriving in Italy, Italians began using their
protectionist rhetoric to legitimize their refugee push back. In a study done by the Pew Research
Center, scholars Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons found that “In Hungary, Italy,
Poland and Greece, more than six-in-ten say they have an unfavorable opinion of the Muslims in
their country… the dominant view is that Muslims want to be distinct from the rest of society rather
than adopt the nation’s customs and way of life” (Simmons, et. al., 2016). Aside from economic
degradation, Italians are fearful of how the influx of Muslim refugees could change the Italian
identity. Thus, this outcome from the Pew Research Center proves significant because it serves
to justify Italians’ exclusionary behavior as they strive to preserve their homogenous identity. The
fact that the “Muslim community [in Italy] is comprised primarily of first-generation immigrants who
retain strong linguistic, economic, and emotional ties to their country of origin” serves to otherize
Muslim refugees and allows Italians to believe that because Muslims refuse to assimilate to the
Italian way of life, they do not belong there (James Toronto, 2008, p. 65). As a result, instead of
creating space for Islam in Italian policy like in Spain, the Italian government has imposed laws
that limit its functionality and place in the public sphere. For example, new mosques cannot be
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built without permission of the government (in which requests are often denied) and throughout
the entire country there are only eight officially recognized mosques. By comparison, France,
which has a Muslim population three to four times bigger than Italy’s, has 2,200 mosques, while
the UK, with a Muslim population approximately twice the size of Italy’s, has 1,500 (Merelli, 2016,
para. 3).
While Italians fear the degradation of their economy, their Islamophobic sentiments are
also grounded through the fear of terrorism and crime. A study conducted by La Sapienza
University in Rome (interviewing 2,000 students ages 14-18 in over 100 towns) found that 50%
of Italian youth believe Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric
laws” (Girard, 2016, p. 6-7). Of course this study does not represent the entirety of Italian
sentiments towards Muslims, but it does highlight a problem that many Italians fail to recognize:
the words refugee and Muslim are not synonymous. Because the largest proportion of refugees
coming into Italy are Muslim, most refugees, especially those from Muslim majority countries,
become homogenized as the “Muslim problem.” However, Muslims are not only stereotyped as
a homogenous group, they are stereotyped with similar traditions. The acts of few (honor
killings, rape, and migrant against migrant crime), which are seen as barbaric and
fundamentalist, emerge to represent the beliefs of all Muslims and prevail in discourse as
rationale for Italian Islamophobic sentiments. Moreover, members of the Lega Nord coopt acts
of crime to advance their xenophobic platform. In 2006, Moroccan El Katawi Dafani stabbed and
killed his daughter after discovering her relations with an Italian man. Although many Italian
Muslims condemned this killing (including Souad Sbai, a member of the Islamic ItalianParliament Party and the Association for Moroccan Women in Italy), the Lega Nord claimed that
the crime was a representation of Islamic traditions. Enzo Bortolotti stated, “here is another case
demonstrating that the Islamic culture cannot be integrated into our society” (Girard, 2016, p.
12). Furthermore, issues surrounding rape and drug trafficking persist at the front of Italian
Islamophobia. Writer Daniel Greenfield conducted research in which he discovered that
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immigrants are accountable 40% of rape in Italy, 6.3% of which are Moroccan. His research led
him to believe that “with statistics like these, it would appear that Italy doesn’t have a problem
with sexual violence, it has a problem with Muslim immigration” (Girard, 2016, p. 13).
Greenfield’s statement serves as an example of how, much like the Lega Nord, many Italians
use certain data to push their anti-Muslim agenda. It is evident that Italy has a problem with
sexual violence, but, unknown to many Italians who use an “extrinsic viewpoint when
confronting societal issues,” Islam is not the defining factor of the sexual violence (Girard, 2016,
p. 13).
Italian perceptions of Islam are also increasingly based on media representations of
radical Islam, especially post the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. that set the
stage for radical Islamic terrorism against the West. As Alietti and Padovan state, “these
[Islamophobic] prejudices have grown slowly over the time, scarcely contrasted, supported by
coarse, but clear, discourses and ideologies, diffused by media and by, so called, ‘political
entrepreneurs of racism’” (Alietti and Padovan, 2013, p. 599). Italian apprehension to welcome
refugees from the Muslim world stems from the assumption (that the media perpetuates) that
radical Islamic groups represent the entirety of Islam and that incoming Muslims (who therefore
support Islamic fundamentalism) will infiltrate Italy with radical, Islamic ideologies, and there is
ample proof to show how the Italian media has manipulated perceptions of incoming and
resettled refugees in Southern Italy. The first major media-covered event in 2009 during the first
wave of Libyan immigration occurred in Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island which acts as a
stepping stone to mainland Italy for many refugees looking to make their way into Europe.
During this event, temporary residents of a refugee camp escaped and marched peacefully into
town, demanding rights of freedom and individual human rights (Girard, 2016, p. 8-9). However,
instead of focusing on the lack of rights these refugees were protesting, the media focused on
the fact that four men set fire to their migrant shelter. Evidently, the Italian media uses an “us”
versus “them” rhetoric to demonstrate how incoming refugees are threatening territory and
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culture that is undoubtedly Italian. Media expert Marco Bruno from La Sapienza University in
Rome identifies three techniques that the Italian media uses to establish and enhance the
discourse of the other: the landing issue and the invasion frame, the immigrant as a security
threat, and the threat to western culture and the religious frame (Bruno, 2016). Bruno also
highlights headlines from media articles which invoke defensive, nationalist sentiments. He
states,
the same frame emerges at the level more strictly of content and terminology.
“Lampedusa: still an emergency”, “Alarm on immigrants, the invasion has restarted”,
“Lampedusa, the days of the exodus”, “Immigrants: record landing”, “An assault that our
country cannot stop”, “The Great invasion has begun”. In all these headlines it clearly
emerges that the theme of arrival and, by extension, the entire media image of migration
are articulated in public discourse through the frame of “conquest” (by the “invaders”) and
“defence” (that is down to the autochthons) of a territory” (Bruno, 2016).

Therefore, by using rhetoric that projects the dangers of Muslim refugees to the West,
the Italian media fabricates three boundaries (both physical and cultural) that refugees
overstep by coming into Italy. Furthermore, Italian Islamophobia scholar Zincone states,
“the fact that the majority of information in the media regarding immigration concerns
crime and its repression is certainly of no help in the attempt to establish low-conflict
relationships and a climate of positive interaction” (James Toronto, 69). Ultimately, the
manipulation of the media is crucial to advancing Italy’s xenophobic agenda, as referring
to refugees as illegal immigrants connotes a specific image which sparks hatred and
distrust of incoming peoples within Italian society.
Overall, it is evident that the basis of Italian Islamophobic attitudes stem from multiple
influences: fear that the influx of refugees can strain the Italian economy and challenge the
homogenous Italian identity, the fear of terrorism, jihadism, and crime, and the perpetuation of
Islam as fundamentalist via manipulation of the media. Backlash is seen from large scale
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immigration and media perceptions of Islam, but these xeno-racist sentiments are also grounded
in right-wing, xenophobic political parties that have institutionalized themselves in the Italian
parliament. Islam is the second most practiced religion in Italy, yet it is not recognized by the
Italian state, and because the Catholic Church is still very prevalent in Italian daily life, a rigid
Italian cultural self-identity is boasted that refuses to incorporate Islam (Haberman, 1988).
Methods
This research is based on the work of other scholars, predominantly Alfredo Alietti and
Dario Padovan who conducted over 1,500 in person interviews [in Italy] about cultural perceptions
and understandings of Islam, as well as that of S. Sayyid, whose understandings of Islamophobia
challenge its existence. Based off of the work of others, I have been able to understand and
formulate my own argument on the roots of contemporary Italian Islamophobia. To better my
research, I would like to move to incorporate the voices and experiences of a few people, rather
than focus so much of my understanding of Islamophobia on understandings that represent the
views of the majority and potentially ignore the voices of those who stand against Islamophobia.
Moreover, in looking to the future, I may incorporate a policy analysis that seeks to address what
Islamophobia may look like in Italy in the near future.
Limitations
The largest impediment to articulating my own argument is working without produced
research that argues against Islamophobia specific to Italy. Without this research, it is difficult to
address a counter argument (something that I believe is crucial to fully articulating my argument)
that is specific and relevant enough to what I am arguing. There has been sufficient research
produced arguing that Italy has well integrated second generation Muslim immigrants into Italian
society (e.g. a study done by Massimo Introvigne that argues the Italian government has created
a favorable environment for religious minorities), but since my argument does not encompass that
demographic, it makes it hard to tie in and refute as outside readers may not understand its
relevance. Despite the fact that the produced research on second generation immigration is not
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specific enough to effectively measure Islamophobia, one could refute that their integration is
proof of the Italian state’s tolerance of Islam. To this I would argue that if the Italian state can
integrate second generation Muslim immigrants they can also integrate incoming immigrations,
something they have yet to do.
Conclusion
Since 2009, Italian immigration policies have transitioned from open, welcoming refugee
rescue legislation to more conservative, protectionist ideology. There is not one, credible
distinction for understanding manifestations of Islamophobia in Italy, but scholars are inclined to
believe that Islamophobic sentiments have increased since September 11, 2001 (and have
resurfaced since the Paris attacks and Syrian refugee crisis), leaving lasting impacts on relations
between Italy and the Muslim world. While scholars like Massimo Introvigne suggest that Italy has
a favorable environment for religious minorities, stating “religious minorities are not seen as
particularly threatening in Italy, simply because they are comparatively small,” others scholars,
notably Alfredo Alietti and Dario Padovan, have conducted thousands of interviews that show the
majority of Italian citizens identify Islam with an immigrant’s country of origin and believe it is a
religion too traditional to assimilate with Western culture (Introvigne, 2001, p. 276).
Understanding the roots of Islamophobia is not only crucial to understanding how the West
defines itself against the East, it is pertinent to understanding the future of political and economic
relationships between Italy and the Muslim world. That is, in recent discourse, scholars have
sought to understand the “able-action knowledge” that policy makers use to institutionalize antiMuslim sentiments. Understanding the importance of the use of specific vernacular helps us know
how we in the West can diminish the dichotomy that stands between the two identities. How, if
even, is this possible? In a critique offered by Ali Akbar Mahdi, he states,
European assimilationist models should be replaced by integrationist policies allowing full
participation of Muslims in European society without giving up their Muslim identity. How
will this be possible? Europe should accept the contribution of Muslim immigrants and
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Muslims should adjust their religion to broader European cultural framework (Mahdi, 2003,
p. 629).

Ultimately, Islamophobic sentiments, perpetuated by media stereotypes and coupled with the lack
of the Italian government’s recognition of Islam as a state religion, ‘otherize’ Italian Muslims and
leave no room for Islam to be inherent in Italian society today. When Italians stop resisting the
infiltration of their hegemonic identity, they can further appreciate the contributions that Muslim
immigrants have brought to the West.
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